With the rapid development of Internet of Things technology (e.g. wireless sensor networks), security has become a global issue. Confidentiality, integrity, and availability (known as the CIA triangle) is widely used to define and model information security. However, this CIA triangle is insufficient to address rapidly changing security requirements. In this article, we divide information systems into four layers: physical layer, operational layer, data layer, and content layers (PODC). Corresponding, hierarchy of information security is proposed. Furthermore, we define the basic security properties for each layer and show that the four properties (i.e. confidentiality, availability, controllability, and authentication, called CACA) are minimally complete and independent for information security. Based on PODC and CACA, a new definition of information security is proposed, which acts as a secure foundation for information systems.
Introduction
Internet of Things (IoT) technology has brought great changes to our daily lives over recent years. It has profoundly affected almost all industries today, from retail to medicine. Wireless sensor networks (WSNs), an integral part of the IoT, play a key role in collecting and conveying isolated information. We have already benefited these novel services, from smart city, self-service store to wearable devices and tiny medical aids. According to the forecast of Gartner, 1 the WSN devices in IoT will reach 20.4 billion in 2020. However, information security has become one of the main problems that hinder the development of WSNs in IoT today. According to 2019 SonicWall Cyber Threat Report, 2 the IoT attacks increase during 2018 by 217.5% from the 10.3 million logged in 2017. An estimated $5.3 billion dollars were spent on security startups in 2018. 3 However, the return to this expenditure is often a ''warm feeling,'' part because of ''the lack of a generally accepted definition of information security.' ' 4 Most definitions of information security focus on confidentiality, integrity, and availability (also known as the ''Security Golden Triangle'' or CIA triangle). For example, Matt Bishop states that ''computer security rests on confidentiality, integrity and availability'' 5 and authoritative text offers another similar definition: ''computer security attempts to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of computing systems' components.'' 6 In this definition, security is only a kind of ''attempt,'' thus it is imprecise. In practice, with the rise of new techniques, security is only aligned with CIA no longer. A typical example is the Stuxnet worm. Known as the first cyber-warfare weapon, Stuxnet was used to attack the Natanz uranium enrichment facility in Iran and it is believed to have caused its production to drop by 15% in 2009. 7 Although Stuxnet did not steal or erase any data, it was used to physically destroy infrastructures of IoT and thus is completely beyond the realm of CIA. [8] [9] [10] Therefore, the CIA triangle is not intrinsic and lacks completeness or precision. With the rise of new Internet of Thing technologies, there are more critical infrastructures needing in WSNs to be strictly controlled. This requires that information security should be re-defined to satisfy security requirements.
To address the above problem, in this article, from the perspective of information flow, we divide information systems into four layers: physical layer, operational layer, data layer, and content layer (PODC). Furthermore, we analyze their security threats. We define the basic security properties for each layer and show that the four properties (i.e. confidentiality, availability, controllability, and authentication, called CACA) are minimally complete and independent for information security. Based on PODC and CACA, a new definition of information security is proposed, which acts as a secure foundation for information systems of WSNs.
The rest of the article is organized as follows: the related work is introduced in ''Hierarchy of information security'' section, and ''Connotation of information security'' section presents the connotation of information security for this article. We propose the new definition of information security in ''Defining information security'' section. Finally, we conclude our work in ''Conclusion'' section.
Hierarchy of information security
In order to precisely define information security, we must analyze information systems. From the perspective of information flow, information systems can be summarized as follows: ''data is processed by software programs running on physical systems before being utilized by users.'' In this summarization, the four notions-physical systems, software program, data, and utilization-are critical. Based on the four notions, information systems can be divided into four layers: physical layer, operational layer, data layer, and content layer. The physical layer, consisting of physical devices and related infrastructures, is the fundamental layer underlying the logical structures of the higher level functions. The operational layer is composed of ''a set of programs, procedures, algorithms and its documentation concerned with operations of a data processing system,'' and tells a computer what to do and how to do it. The data layer deals with operations involving information. Such operations include collection, processing, retrieval, transmission, exchange, and display of information. Different from the data layer, the content layer focuses on ''information semantics,'' dealing with how to use the information reasonably. As information systems consist of these four layers, the corresponding security problems exist in each layer. As such, from bottom to up, information security can also be divided into four layers-physical, operational, data, and content security (PODC), as shown in Figure 1 .
Physical security
The goal of ''physical security'' is to protect physical devices and infrastructures from being attacked and damaged. With an increasing number of physical devices being located outside of homes or offices, physical security is becoming more urgent. According to Kaspersky Lab ICS (industrial control systems) research, almost 40% of critical infrastructure and are facing a cyber-attack infrastructure and ICS, including electricity grids, water supplies, and cellphone networks in 2017. 11 These attacks have increased in other parts of the world as well; for example, Ukrainian power system was attacked by a supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) cyber-attack in 2015. This attack left around 230,000 people in the West of the country without power for hours. Today, the majority of the control systems that run critical infrastructures are vulnerable to attack. [12] [13] [14] [15] The main threats to the physical layer come from two sources: (1) physical environments such as earthquake, fire, equipment failure and (2) attacks such as electromagnetic leakage, communication interference, signal injection, theft. The major approaches to protecting the physical layer from being threatened by physical environments include fault tolerance and disaster tolerance.
Fault tolerance. A system is fault-tolerant, if it can provide normal services, even facing the failures of one or more components. [16] [17] [18] Fault tolerance reduces the risk induced by random errors. Generally, a fault-tolerance system has the following basic characteristics: (1) all single points cannot fail simultaneously; (2) it must be equipped with mechanisms to isolate the failure components and prevent the spread of failure. Typical technologies include replication, redundancy, and diversity.
Disaster tolerance. Consider that a system is deployed in one site; the failure of the site results in the failure of fault-tolerant technology. 19, 20 To solve this problem, disaster-tolerance technology is proposed. In disastertolerance technology, subsystems with the same functions are deployed in more than one site. Once one site fails (e.g. it is physically damaged), system automatically switches to other site to ensure the continuation of services. Apart from the environment factor, the physical layer is often vulnerable to human attacks, including invasive attacks and non-invasive attacks.
Invasive attacks. In invasive attacks, adversaries observe, manipulate, tamper, and interfere with systems by way of getting into the devices or institute internals. 21 At the chip level, the typical ways include micro-probing, reverse engineering, injecting or changing control signal, or reconstructing the internal circuit. Correspondingly, three types of techniques are used to prevent invasive attacks: physical invasion prevention, reverse attack prevention and invasion detection and forensics technology.
Non-invasive attacks. Non-invasive attacks, as the name indicates, do not require the device to be opened. 21 They include two types: side-channel attacks (SCA) and fault induction attacks (FIA). In SCA, attackers observe and analyze different boundary characteristics (such as timing information, power consumption, electromagnetic leaks or even sound.) gained from the physical implementation, rather than brute force or theoretical weaknesses in the algorithms to obtain relevant information. Typical SCA involve timing, electromagnetic radiation, energy consumption, visible light, frequency, and scanning attacks. Using the antenna radiation keyboard, a Swiss scholar could restore information as far as over 20 m away with an accuracy of up to 95%. 12 In FIA, attackers induce and analyze logical errors of systems by changing the system parameters to obtain information. Adversaries can obtain software code, data, and even the confidential information through FIA. Fault induction technologies include radiation imprinting, temperature imprinting, voltage imprinting.
Operational security
Even if the physical layer is secure, security risks exist in the operational layer because of the uncertainty of software domain, openness of software development, and complexity of various operating environments.
Operational security is a process protecting software from abnormal operations such as sudden failing or being attacked. According to a recent estimate, 4180 vulnerabilities in operating systems, application software, and web sites were found between May and July of 2019, with 30.9% of these vulnerabilities labeled as ''high'' severity. 22 Due to these vulnerabilities, the number of computer viruses and malwares introduced in 2018 was found to exceed 137.47 million. 23 Up to 32% of the world's computers are infected with some type of malware. 24 Cybersecurity Ventures predict cybercrime will cost the world in excess of $6 trillion annually by 2021. 25 Vulnerability, malicious attacks, and nonmalicious human errors are the main factors that influence the security of operations.
Vulnerability is a weakness which allows adversary to reduce a system's information assurance and always accompanies in the all lifecycle of software. 26, 27 In modern software practice, developers are profoundly aware that an efficient software development process, covering a series of management activities from requirement analysis to software destruction, is the main way to decrease the software vulnerability. Typical methods of software process managements involve 28 capability maturity model integration (CMMI) 29, 30 and software process assessment and improvement, represented by ISO/IEC 15504. Under the thought that ''software processes are software too,'' the software process models can be used not only to control the software process but to improve software process theory, thus providing automatic support for lowering software vulnerabilities.
Malicious attacks, and non-malicious human errors are the two factors in the operational layer that lead to two types of insecure consequences: denial of service and error output. The Department of Homeland Security and MITER listed 519 kinds of attack methods. 31 To avoid the artificial attack and non-malicious human errors, the assessment, policy, protection, detection, reaction, and restoration (APPDRR) model is often adopted in practice. The first step of APPDRR model is to assess all risks caused by attacks and nonmalicious disoperation. If risks are affordable, then security policies are formulated to balance risks and security costs. Generally, policies are dynamically updated with the change of risks and requirements. Once policies are formulated, the corresponding protection techniques are configured to prevent malicious attacks and non-malicious human errors. Because protection techniques are always incomplete, we must monitor its running state and detect possible failures for a security-critical system. Once failures are detected, reaction must be really made for decreasing the loss caused by failures. For a disaster event, quick restorations are needed to provide contiguous services. The six steps of the APPDRR model evolve by a dynamic and spiral way.
Data security
Even if both the physical and operational layers are secure, the data layer may be insecure, because these two layers only guarantee that systems themselves (not including data within the systems) are secure. Data security is a process to prevent data in transmission, processing, or storage from being disclosed, imitated, tampered, repudiated, and stolen. According to the Identity Theft Resource Center (ITRC), 668 breaches compromised 22,408,258 records between 1 January and 2 July, 2018, with at least 1.7 million Banking/ Credit/Financial records involving exposure of individual's name plus Social Security Number, driver's license number, medical record, or financial record/credit/ debit card. 32 The organizational cost for a company to recover from a data breach has grown to $3.86 million. 33 The main threats in the data layers include passive eavesdropping, active listening, unauthorized access, man-in-the-middle attack, session hijacking, false identity, replay attack, control flow analysis. The corresponding protection technologies are cryptography and security protocols, and so on.
Content security
Content security, related with the utilization of information, is a process to control which content can be published, propagated, and used. In the content layer, there are two kinds of information: harmful information and non-harmful information; thus, the research fields addressing this layer can be correspondingly divided into two kinds: (1) how to protect non-harmful information to legally be propagated and used; (2) how to prevent harmful information be published, propagated, and used. The essential difference between data security and content security is that data security focuses on information self, while content security deals with the utilization of information.
In the content security, two roles are worthy to be distinguished: one is ''content producers'' p and the other is ''content consumers'' c. Each role has two expectations of using information: (1) p is willing to his information produced to be consumed by c, denoted by e p ; if p is unwilling, the expectation is denoted by e p ; (2) c is willing to use information produced by p, denoted by e c ; if c is unwilling, the expectation is denoted by e c . So there exist four patterns: (e p , e c ), (e p , e c ), (e p , e c ), and (e p , e c ). In pattern (e p , e c ), consumers are willing to use information produced by producers and these producers also expect this information to be consumed by these consumers; therefore, human intervention is not needed. In pattern (e p , e c ), although producers expect information produced by them to be consumed by consumers, these consumers do not expect to use this information. (e p , e c ) is just opposite to (e p , e c ). Typical examples for mode (e p , e c ) and (e p , e c ) are SPAM (which is the use of email systems to send unsolicited bulk messages, especially advertising, indiscriminately) and Digital Rights Management (DRM), which controls the use of digital content and devices after sale is in pattern (e p , e c ). Pattern (e p , e c ) does not happen in practice.
If supervisors are considered, another pattern becomes very important: a consumer is willing to use information produced by a producer and this producer also expect his information to be consumed, but a supervisor do not agree on the utilization. A typical example for this is ''content filtering,'' which controls what content is permitted to a reader via the Internet.
Connotation of information security
Information security is often represented by CIA. As shown above, the rise of new technologies (e.g. Internet of Vehicles, [34] [35] [36] [37] Heterogeneous Sensor Networks, [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] Edge Computing, 44, 45 Smart City, 46 Blockchain) [47] [48] [49] makes CIA unsuitable. In this section, we will answer two fundamental problems: which security properties are fundamental? What are connotations of these properties? In order to solve the first problem, we define the following definition. Definition 1. A set of security properties is complete if all security requirements can be deduced from these properties.
Because security requirements might variety in the different layers, we will redefine the completeness for each layer in the next subsections. Because a number of complete subsets could exist for the same requirements, it is necessary to define its minimal complete subset.
Definition 2. Given a complete set P of properties and its subset P i , P i is minimal if, for any complete subset P x (P x P), P i j jł P x j j, that is, the cardinality of P x is greater than or equal to that of Pi. 
System security
In the system layer (including the physical layer and the software layer), we may not care who provides services to whom, but we do care about the capability of service. Generally, two kinds of service capabilities exist: (1) the first type is that the expected services, representing the requirements of users, can actually be provided, and (2) the second type is that the actual services, representing services that a system can provide, are consistent with the expected services. In order to analyze which security properties are fundamental for the system layer, the first priority is to define these services. Although services provided may dynamically change as the requirements themselves change, they typically remain fixed within a given time period (thus allowing them to be defined). Thus, the expected and actual services are formally modeled as sets, denoted as ExpServ and ActServ, respectively. For a given system, if any expected service can actually be provided, we can conclude that the system meets the availability requirements. Likewise, if any provided service proves to be consistent with the user's expectations, then the system meets the authentication requirements. Next, we define availability and authentication.
Definition 5: availability. The availability of the system layer (denoted by Avail SYS ) is defined as follows: for any expected service x, there exists an actual service y which satisfies x, that is,
Note that the meaning of ''satisfaction'' varies for different formal systems; here, equality is adopted. Because availability is used to describe the capability of a system to provide services, the other three kinds for availability can be stemmed from Definition 1 as follows.
Definition 6: weak availability. The weak availability of the system layer (denoted by Avail W SYS ) is defined as follows: there exists an expected service x, such that any actual service y satisfies x, that is, Avail W SYS [9x 2 ExpServ. 8y 2 ActServ. x = y.
Definition 7: weakest availability. The weakest availability of the system level (denoted by Avail LW SYS ) is defined as follows: there exists an expected service x and an actual service y such that y satisfies x, that is, As mentioned above, the other capability of the system layer involves that the provided service is consistent with the user's expectations. This consistency with expectation is related to authentication. The Oxford Dictionary defines authentication as ''(the ability to) prove or show (something, especially a claim or an artistic work) to be true or genuine.'' In order to decide whether authentication is satisfied, two schemes are often used: one is based on comparison while the other is based on logical reasoning. In the first scheme, a key factor involves defining templates. Once templates have been defined, the remaining work involves comparing the actual service with the templates. If they are consistent, then the service is genuine. In the second scheme, should a logical contradiction be found, the service is determined to be untrue. In the system layer, the first scheme is often adopted. Based on this analysis, we define authentication as follows.
Definition 10: authentication. The authentication of the system layer (denoted by Auth SYS ) is satisfied, if for any actual service x, an expected service y exists, such that x satisfies y, that is, Auth SYS [8x 2 ActServ. 9y 2 ExpServ. x = y.
Similar to availability, three other types of authenticity are discussed here.
Definition 11: weak authentication. The weak authentication of the system layer (denoted by Auth W SYS ) is satisfied, if there exists an actual service x such that for any expected y, x satisfies y, that is, Auth W SYS [9x 2 ActServ. 8y 2 ExpServ. x = y.
Definition 12: weakest authentication. The weakest authentication of the system layer (denoted by Auth LW SYS ) is satisfied, if there exists an actual service x and an expected service y such that x satisfies y, that is,
Definition 13: strong authentication. The strong authentication of the system layer (denoted by Auth S SYS ) is satisfied, if for any actual service x and any expected service y, x satisfies y, that is, Auth S SYS [8x 2 ActServ. 8y 2 ExpServ. x = y.
Proposition 4. Given a system, if Auth S SYS holds, then jExpServj = jActServj = 1.
Proposition 5. Given a system, if Auth W SYS holds, then jActServj = 1.
The above two propositions show that, if Auth S SYS and Auth W SYS are true, then the numbers of the actual services and the expected services are equal to 1, respectively, which means that Definition 11 and Definition 13 are impractical. Definition 10 implies Definition 12, meaning that Definition 10 is the strictest.
Definition 14: completeness in the system layer. Given a set P of security properties, set ExpServ and set ActServ, P is called P SYS -complete in the system layer, if all p (p 2 P) holding under both ExpServ and ActServ implies ExpServ = ActServ.
Because only services are considered in the system layer, the corresponding security goal is to ensure that the services actually are equal to those of the expected services. As such, we have the following theorem.
Proof. If Avail Sys is satisfied, then for any x 2 ExpServ, x 2 ActServ holds, that is, ExpServ ActServ; and if Auth Sys is satisfied, then for any x 2 ActServ, we have x 2 ExpServ, that is, ActServ ExpServ. Thus, {Avail Sys , Auth Sys } is P SYS -complete. Proof. Let ExpServ = fa, bg and ActServ = fa, b, cg, then Avail Sys holds, and Auth Sys is false, therefore Avail SYS 6 ) Auth SYS ;
Let ExpServ = fa, bg and ActServ = fag, Auth Sys is true, and Avail Sys is false, therefore Auth SYS 6 ) Avail SYS .
Data security
The main security goals of the data layer are to protect data from being stolen, tampered with, and repudiated during the period of data storage, retrieval, transmittal, and display. In order to analyze the security requirements in this layer, three basic security roles should be distinguished: initiator (subjects in the source), responder (subjects in the destination), and attacker, as shown in Figure 2 . Figure 2 models an attack of the strongest threat. In this model, attackers can steal, intercept, analyze, counterfeit, and store any data being transmitted between initiators and responders. Send : INIT ! 2 INIT 3 RESP 3 DATA denotes that an initiator sends data to a responder with the constraint that Send(x)" 1 = fxg, where " 1 denotes the project on the first dimension. For example, a, b, c ð Þ f g " 1 = a f g. Send(x) = f(x, y, z)g means that initiator x sends data z to responder y.
Recv : RESP ! 2 INIT 3 RESP 3 Data denotes that a responder receives data from an initiator with the constraint that Recv(y)" 2 = f(y)g, where " 2 denotes the project on the second dimension. For example, a, b, c ð Þ f g " 2 = b f g. Recv(y) = f(x, y, z)g means that responder y receives data z from initiator x. With an initiator able to send data to many responders at one time, and a responder able to receive multiple data sets at any given time, the domain of the function in Definition 15 is a power set. 
As shown above, an attack can occur as a legal communicator, and we should be able to distinguish between the two. Let Init = INIT À Atk and Resp = RESP À Atk, where Atk is a set of attackers. In Definition 18, the unexpected responders include attackers and the other occasional obtainers. If we limit the unexpected responders to attackers, then we have the following definition. Proposition 7. Cnfdt DATA ) Cnfdt Atk DATA . Similar to the system layer, one important property in the data layer is authentication. Generally, state Y authenticates state X if the following statement holds: ''if state Y occurs, then state X must have occurred in the past.'' For example, an authentication protocol contains at least two states: one is ''principal B begins a protocol run with principal A 00 '' (called state X 0 ), and the other is ''principal A finishes a protocol run with principal B 00 '' (called state Y 0 ). Principal A authenticates principal B if state X 0 precedes state Y 0 . 28 We give an intuitive example: in a bank system, an employee must type in his or her user name and correct password before beginning his or her routine tasks. In this case, typing in the correct username and password is the process of authenticating his identification.
Definition 20. The authentication in the data layer, denoted by Auth DATA , decides whether the corresponding initiator has sent the related data when a responder receives data, that is In Definition 20, authentication means that, if receiver y receives message z sent by x, then x has indeed sent z to y. Generally, there are two kinds of definitions surrounding authentication: identity authentication and message authentication. Identity authentication is the process of verifying an identity claimed by or for a system entity, while message authentication involves verifying an individual message. There are separate definitions for the initiator's and responder's data.
Definition 21. Identity authentication in the data layer, denoted by Auth ID DATA , is used to decide whether a corresponding initiator has sent a message when a responder receives it, that is Definition 22. Message authentication in the data layer, denoted by Auth Msg DATA , is used to decide whether the corresponding message has been sent when a responder receives a message, that is Auth Msg DATA [8x 2 Init: 8y 2 Resp: 8z 2 DATA:(x, y, z) 2 Recv(y) ! 9(x, y x , z) 2 Send(x) Proposition 8. Auth DATA ) Auth Msg DATA , Auth DATA ) Auth ID DATA . As shown above, the data layer has the three roles: initiators, responders, and attackers. Also there exist three basic requirements in this layer: (1) in the event that attacks take place, the data sent by initiators are able to reach the expected responders; (2) responders can receive the corresponding data from the expected initiators; and (3) attackers cannot obtain any data belonging solely to initiators and responders. We can prove that {Auth DATA , Avail DATA , Cnfdt DATA } is minimally complete and independent. 
Content security
As shown in ''Introduction'' section, the main security goals of content security are to protect information from being illegally used. Because this layer deals with information utilization, producers, consumers, and supervisors (e.g. trusted third parties (TTPs)) are its basic roles. One may also regard propagators as playing an important role; however, in the utilization level, the process of simply forwarding information can also be seen as a simple intersection between the producers and consumers of this information. Similar to data security, these roles have different user expectations and user actions.
Definition 24: user expectation. Let Prvd = fp 1 , p 2 , . . .g, Cnsm = fc 1 , c 2 , . . .g, and Info = fi 1 , i 2 , . . .g denote sets of consumers, producers, and pieces of information, respectively. User expectation is defined as follows.
PrvdExp : Prvd ! 2 Cnsm 3 Prvd 3 Info returns the producer expectation, and PrvdExp(p) = f(c, p, i)g means that the producer p expects consumer c to use the information i produced by p. A constraint of PrvdExp is PrvdExp(p)" 2 = fpg, where " 2 denotes the project on the second dimension. For example, a, b, c ð Þ f g " 2 = b f g. CnsmExp : Cnsm ! 2 Cnsm 3 Prvd 3 Info returns the consumer expectation, and CnsmExp(c) = f(c, p, i)g means that the consumer c hopes to use information i produced by p. A constraint of CnsmExp is CnsmExp(c)" 1 = fcg, where " 1 denotes the project on the first dimension, for example, a, b, c ð Þ f g " 1 = a f g. CnsmAct : Cnsm ! 2 Cmsm 3 Prvd 3 Info returns the information which has actually been consumed. Its constraint is CnsmAct(x)" 1 = fxg, with CnsmAct(c) = f(c, p, i)g meaning that information i produced by p can be consumed by c.
In some cases, the expectations of some roles conflict with the other. For example, a spammer obviously hopes to push ad emails to all users; conversely, a user on the receiving end does not want to receive these emails.
Definition 25. In the utilization layer, information is available for consumers, denoted by Avail cnsm UTIL , if, for any (x, y, i) 2 CnsmExp(x), (x, y, i) 2 CnsmAct(x) holds, that is Definition 25 defines availability from the point of view of consumers: a consumer is able to use the expected information produced by a given producer. Another important characteristic involves ensuring that the obtained information actually meets users' expectations. This is related to authentication. Definition 26 states that both the obtained information and its source should both meet expectations. Next, we define the completeness (called P UTIL -completeness) in utilization layer (the behaviors of producers and supervisors are not considered). Definition 28 shows that if the consumer x is glad to consume the information i produced by the producer y, and y is willing to have its information i be consumed by x, and then x can consume i. In DRM, a consumer who is not authorized should be prohibited from consuming the related information. This principle is concerned with controllability, and defined as follows.
Definition 29. In the case that the expectation of producers is considered, controllability in the utilization level, denoted by Ctrl prvd UTIL , is satisfied, if for any (x, y, i) 6 2 PrvdExp(y), then (x, y, i) 6 2 CnsmAct(x), that is,
One example in which Ctrl prvd UTIL is violated involves the use of copyrighted content without permission. Next, we define the completeness (called P prvd UTIL ) in utilization level when supervisors are considered. 3 show that authentication and availability are minimally complete and independent from the perspective of services; Theorems 4-6 suggest that data security relies on confidentiality, authentication, and availability and the three properties are minimally complete and independent; Theorems 13-15 demonstrate that in the content layer, controllability, availability, and authentication are minimally complete and independent from the point of view of information utilization because CACA is minimally complete and independent.
Defining information security
As shown above, information security can be divided into four layers from bottom to top: physical, operational, data, and content security, respectively. Security of the first two layers depends on authentication and availability from the point of view of services; the third layer relies on confidentiality, authentication, and availability of data from the point of view of data self; and the fourth layer depends on controllability, availability, and authentication from the point of view of utilization. Because confidentiality, availability, controllability, and authentication are independent and complete in each layer, the four properties are called fundamental security properties, denoted by CACA, as shown in Figure 3 . Based on this analysis, we give the definition of information security, as follows.
Definition 34: information security. Information security, including physical, operational, data, and content security, is a process to guarantee systems to provide the expected service by way of protecting availability and authentication in the system layer; ensure data to be sent and received correctly via protecting confidentiality, availability, and authentication in the data layer; and protect information to be used within expectation by satisfying controllability, availability, and authentication in the utilization layers.
For instance, in sensor networks, if the sensors are stolen and maliciously embedded, then its physical security is not satisfied. Operation security guarantees the operation flow should keep away from malicious attacks and non-human errors. Data security insures that an attacker cannot obtain the data collected from sensors. Content security means that information content is not displayed to unauthorized users. In addition to the availability and confidentiality in traditional security scenarios, authentication improves the conception of integrity, and controllability emphasizes that the flow of information should be controlled by managers. In general, integrity only verifies the correctness of information self, and authentication also verifies the correctness of the user's identity. Besides, controllability addresses the content of information and ensures that the flow of information conforms to the wishes of the system designer.
From the point of view of security property, Definition 34 emphasizes four properties: confidentiality, authentication, controllability, and availability. Compared with CIA model, in CACA, integrity is substituted with authentication and controllability is added. This makes up for limitations of CIA: (1) in CIA, integrity means that information can be modified only by authorized parties or only in authorized ways, This shows that the authenticity of the source and the destination of information is not concerned for integrity. As shown in ''Hierarchy of information security'' section, authentication expresses not only the authenticity of information source but also the authenticity of information self, where the latter precisely implies integrity; (2) a large number of annoying information greatly influences our life, controlling information to reasonably be used is becoming a urgent requirement. However, this cannot be expressed in CIA.
As shown in Figures 4 and 5 , some layer models called BCDD (behavior, content, data, device security) and MDOD (management/people, data/information, operation, device/physical security) have respectively been proposed for defining information security. In BCDD, operational security is not considered. As shown in ''Introduction'' section, the operation layer instructs data how to be done. If the operation security is not secure, then data will not be secure, so BCDD model is unsuitable for complex security scenarios, such as massive amounts of equipment and data in IoT. Although MDOD takes into operational security, the utilization of information is considered in this model. As shown in ''Introduction'' section, a great deal of annoying information is flooding on the Internet; as a result, a model which does not include the utilization of information is inappropriate. Although BCDD and MDOD regard behavior security and management/people security as an independent layer, respectively, but we believe that the two securities should be throughout all layers. For example, in the physical layer, the policy about people security should be formulated to provide physical security. These demonstrate that PODC shown in ''Introduction'' section is more suitable for defining information security.
Conclusion
The existing definitions of information security might bring confusion and provide little guidance about the security objectives. In this article, a new definition of information security is proposed to provide guidance for further security practice. In the future, new definitions should be proposed to satisfy the increasing and changing security requirements.
